Police Reform, Training and Crime: Experimental evidence from Colombia´s Plan Cuadrantes
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More about this item
KeywordsCrime; Public Sector Training; Field Experiments.;
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2013-03-09 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-URE-2013-03-09 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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