IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/003475.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rigideces Institucionales Y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Los Casos De Argentina, Colombia, México Y Perú

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Echeverry
  • Jorge Alexander Bonilla
  • Andrés Moya

Abstract

En los últimos anos se ha hecho evidente que los gobiernos cuentan con un margen de maniobra reducido en la elaboración del presupuesto, pues una proporción importante de los gastos se encuentra predeterminada por normas legales, mandatos constitucionales, compromisos previamente adquiridos por el gobierno, y requerimientos del actual ejercicio presupuestario. Este estudio analiza el fenómeno de las inflexibilidades presupuestales partiendo de una discusión teórica sobre las razones que dan origen a la presencia de este fenómeno, y examina en particular el caso de cuatro países latinoamericanos: Argentina, Colombia, México y Perú, usando el presupuesto de 2003. En cada uno de estos países se estudia el origen y magnitud de las inflexibilidades presupuestales, así como las posibles soluciones o tratamientos que se han implementado para superarlas. La metodología adoptada sigue la taxonomía de inflexibilidades sugerida por Echeverry et al. (2004) y proporciona un esquema de clasificación de los rubros por nivel de inflexibilidad: alta, media y baja. Los resultados senalan que de los cuatro países Argentina es tal vez el más crítico en materia de rigidez, cuenta con una alta inflexibilidad en el gasto y el ingreso, sus recursos son apenas cerca de la mitad de los gastos y posee una porción apreciable de rentas parafiscales. Generalmente, la inflexibilidad en el gasto de estos países es explicada por las partidas asociadas a servicios personales y pensiones. En cuanto a los ingresos, México es un caso excepcional, sus recursos son 100% flexibles y tienden a equiparar las erogaciones. No obstante, en materia de exenciones tributarias, sus tratamientos fiscales preferenciales alcanzan un cuarto de sus ingresos. Finalmente el documento expone algunas recomendaciones extractadas de los modelos usados por cada país que podrían ser aplicables a otras naciones del mismo grupo de estudio.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales Y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Los Casos De Argentina, Colombia, México Y Perú," Documentos CEDE 003475, Universidad de los Andes – Facultad de Economía – CEDE.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:003475
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/8013/dcede2006-33.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
    2. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1995. "Money-Based Versus Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization with Endogenous Fiscal Policy," Working Papers 95-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer.
    4. Rudolf Hommes, 1998. "Evolución y racionalidad de las instituciones presupuestales en Colombia," Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrollo, March.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944.
    6. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin, 2004. "La Batalla Política Por El Presupuesto De La Nación: Inflexibilidades O Supervivencia Fiscal," Documentos CEDE 002944, Universidad de los Andes – Facultad de Economía – CEDE.
    7. Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "Explaining fiscal policies and inflation in developing countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1, Supple), pages 16-48, March.
    8. Martin Feldstein, 2002. "The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment," NBER Working Papers 9203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Alberto F. Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 13-36, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    11. Ulpiano Ayala Oramas & Roberto Perotti, 2000. "The Colombian budget process," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 002535, Fedesarrollo.
    12. Roubini, Nouriel, 1991. "Economic and political determinants of budget deficits in developing countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1, Supple), pages 49-72, March.
    13. Charles Wyplosz, 2002. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions vs. Rules," IHEID Working Papers 03-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    14. Ulpiano Ayala Oramas & Roberto Perotti, 2000. "The colombian budget process," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 003574, Fedesarrollo.
    15. Andres Velasco, 1997. "Debts and Deficits with Fragmented Fiscal Policymaking," NBER Working Papers 6286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Rudolf Hommes, 1996. "Evolution and Rationality of Budget Institutions in Colombia," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 5920, Inter-American Development Bank.
    17. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
    18. Hernandez, Gustavo Adolfo & Soto, Carolina & Prada, Sergio & Ramirez, Juan Mauricio, 2000. "Exenciones tributarias: Costo fiscal y análisis de incidencia [Tax exemptions: fiscal cost and incidence analysis]," MPRA Paper 14546, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1989. "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Economies," NBER Working Papers 2919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Andres Velasco & Alejandro Neut, 2003. "Tough Policies, Incredible Policies?," NBER Working Papers 9932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    22. repec:idb:wpaper:317 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ignacio Lozano & Hernán Rincón & Miguel Sarmiento & Jorge Ramos, 2008. "Regla fiscal cuantitativa para consolidar y blindar las finanzas públicas de Colombia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 10(19), pages 311-352, July-Dece.
    2. Luis Ignacio Lozano, 2011. "Caracterización macro de la política fiscal en Colombia y postura frente a la crisis global (2008-2009)," Revista Cuadernos de Economía, Universidad Nacional de Colombia -FCE - CID, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 2303, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 9091, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin, 2004. "La Batalla Política Por El Presupuesto De La Nación: Inflexibilidades O Supervivencia Fiscal," Documentos CEDE 002944, Universidad de los Andes – Facultad de Economía – CEDE.
    4. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubín, 2005. "Budget Inflexibility," Documentos CEDE 002070, Universidad de los Andes – Facultad de Economía – CEDE.
    5. Eduardo Wiesner, 2008. "The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy Reform in Latin America," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12913.
    6. Chiara Dalle Nogare, 2000. "I governi di coalizione sono tutti "fiscally irresponsible"? Un'indagine empirica con l'utilizzo della cluster analysis," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 93-130.
    7. Andres Velasco, 1997. "Debts and Deficits with Fragmented Fiscal Policymaking," NBER Working Papers 6286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Michał Mackiewicz, 2006. "Przyczyny deficytu finansów publicznych w świetle nowej ekonomii politycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 1-22.
    9. Robert A.J. Dur & Ben D. Peletier & Otto H. Swank, 1997. "The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Public Investment if Budget Deficits are Politically Motivated," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-125/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Pitsoulis, Athanassios & Siebel, Jens Peter, 2009. "Zur politischen Ökonomie von Defiziten und Kapitalsteuerwettbewerb," Discourses in Social Market Economy 2009-13, OrdnungsPolitisches Portal (OPO).
    11. Alfredo Monte & Luca Pennacchio, 2020. "Corruption, Government Expenditure and Public Debt in OECD Countries," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(4), pages 739-771, December.
    12. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Ziogas, Thanasis & Panagiotidis, Theodore, 2021. "Revisiting the political economy of fiscal adjustments," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    14. Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 105-125, April.
    15. Yianos Kontopoulos & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from OECD Countries," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 81-102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    17. Abel Bojar, 2015. "Intra-governmental bargaining and political budget cycles in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 90-115, March.
    18. Baqir, Reza, 1999. "Districts, spillovers, and government overspending," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2192, The World Bank.
    19. Karin Mayr, 2006. "Optimal budget deficits and immigration," Economics working papers 2006-19, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    20. Olivera, Mauricio & Pachón, Mónica & Perry, Guillermo, 2011. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform: The Case of Colombia, 1986-2006," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1718, Inter-American Development Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Presupuesto; inflexibilidad; política fiscal;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000089:003475. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceandco.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Universidad De Los Andes-Cede (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceandco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.