Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto
Este documento fue comisionado por la Red de Gestión Pública y Transparencia del Diálogo Regional de Política para la VII Reunión Hemisférica celebrada los días 8 y 9 de mayo de 2006.
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