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Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto

  • Juan Carlos Echeverry
  • Jorge Alexander Bonilla
  • Andrés Moya

Este documento fue comisionado por la Red de Gestión Pública y Transparencia del Diálogo Regional de Política para la VII Reunión Hemisférica celebrada los días 8 y 9 de mayo de 2006.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank in its series IDB Publications (Working Papers) with number 9091.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:9091
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  1. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
  2. Alberto F. Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 13-36 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1995. "Money-Based Versus Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization with Endogenous Fiscal Policy," Working Papers 95-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  4. Ulpiano Ayala Oramas & Roberto Perotti, 2000. "The colombian budget process," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 003574, FEDESARROLLO.
  5. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Martin Feldstein, 2002. "The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment," NBER Working Papers 9203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Andres Velasco & Alejandro Neut, 2003. "Tough Policies, Incredible Policies?," NBER Working Papers 9932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Sebastian Edwards & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "Explaining Fiscal Policies and Inflation in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 3493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Roubini, Nouriel, 1991. "Economic and political determinants of budget deficits in developing countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1, Supple), pages S49-S72, March.
  10. Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
  11. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  12. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin, 2004. "La Batalla Política Por El Presupuesto De La Nación: Inflexibilidades O Supervivencia Fiscal," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 002944, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  13. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer.
  15. Andres Velasco, 1997. "Debts and Deficits with Fragmented Fiscal Policymaking," NBER Working Papers 6286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Fatás, Antonio & Mihov, Ilian, 2002. "The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion," CEPR Discussion Papers 3277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Charles Wyplosz, 2002. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions vs. Rules," IHEID Working Papers 03-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  18. Rudolf Hommes, 1996. "Evolution and Rationality of Budget Institutions in Colombia," Research Department Publications 4024, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  19. Hernandez, Gustavo Adolfo & Soto, Carolina & Prada, Sergio & Ramirez, Juan Mauricio, 2000. "Exenciones tributarias: Costo fiscal y análisis de incidencia
    [Tax exemptions: fiscal cost and incidence analysis]
    ," MPRA Paper 14546, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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