Regulation, Supervision, and Bank Risk-Taking
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More about this item
Keywords
Bank risk-taking; bank supervision; bank regulation; capital requirements; deposit insurance; bank resolution; bank liquidation.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
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