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Selection, Mutation, and the Preservation of Diversity in Evolutionary Games

Author

Listed:
  • Jack Hirshleifer

    (UCLA)

  • Juan Carlos Martinez Coll

    (Universidad de Malaga)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Jack Hirshleifer & Juan Carlos Martinez Coll, 1992. "Selection, Mutation, and the Preservation of Diversity in Evolutionary Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 648, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:648
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp648.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jack Hirshleifer & Juan Carlos Martinez Coll, 1988. "What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(2), pages 367-398, June.
    2. Per Molander, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(4), pages 611-618, December.
    3. Ulrich Mueller, 1987. "Optimal Retaliation for Optimal Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 692-724, December.
    4. Barton Lipman, 1986. "Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 315-331, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
    2. Riechmann, Thomas, 2001. "Two Notes on Replication in Evolutionary Modelling," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-239, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    3. Juan C Martinez-Coll, 2006. "Caves, Temples, Palaces and Bazaars Building with Jack Hirshleifer’s bricks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001048, David K. Levine.
    4. Frey Bruno S., 2010. "Federalism as an Effective Antidote to Terrorism," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 489-502, December.

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