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Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

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  • Eric Maskin

    (UCLA)

  • John G. Riley

    (UCLA)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1986. "Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 407, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:407
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp407.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    2. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lambrecht, Bart & Perraudin, William, 2003. "Real options and preemption under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 619-643, February.
    3. Lamping, Jennifer, 2007. "The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk," MPRA Paper 24375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Baye, M.R. & Tian, G. & Zhou, J., 1990. "The Existence of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Games with Payoffs that are Not Quasiconcave," Discussion Paper 1990-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Fernando Branco, 1996. "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 283-309, December.
    6. Philippe Bich & Rida Laraki, 2014. "On the Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Sharing Rule Solutions in Discontinuous Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01071678, HAL.
    7. Philippe Bich & Rida Laraki, 2014. "On the Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Sharing Rule Solutions in Discontinuous Games," Working Papers hal-01071678, HAL.
    8. Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997. "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers 208, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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