Recycling With Endogeneous Consumer Participation
We show that the cost of sorting and the network effects jointly determine the rate of participation of consumers in the process of recycling. The dominant producer of virgin material takes into account the recycling activities when it makes its pricing decision. The network effects can create multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. The government can improve welfare by influencing equilibrium selection. On montre que le coût de triage et les effets de réseau déterminent le taux de participation des consommateurs au processus de recyclage. La firme dominante tient compte des activités de recyclage en choisissant le prix du produit primaire. Les effets de réseau peuvent créer la multiplicité d'équilibres stationnaires. Le gouvernement peut améliorer le bien-être social par son influence sur le choix d'équilibres.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2006|
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- Swan, Peter L, 1980. "Alcoa: The Influence of Recycling on Monopoly Power," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 76-99, February.
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- Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1974. "Alcoa revisited: The welfare implications of a secondhand market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 254-271, March.
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