Optimal Combinatorial Mechanism Design
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Fernando Branco, 1996. "Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 77-101.
- Nikolai Kukushkin, 2013. "Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 1039-1060, April.
- Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May.
- Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpoe, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 18 Jun 1999.
- Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2002.
"Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 71-79, February.
- Monteiro, P. K., 1999. "Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 358, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Levin, Jonathan, 1997. "An Optimal Auction for Complements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 176-192, February.
- Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-361, March.
- Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-1119, July.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2013.
"Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 359-403, October.
- Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2010. "Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks," Working Papers 201022, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Rajnish Kumar & Ruben Juarez, 2011. "Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2011-03, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2012. "Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks," Working Papers 201203, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Schwarz, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 597-602, May.
- Hikmet Gunay & Xin Meng, 2012. "Exposure Problem in Multi-unit Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0848, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design with Single-Dimensionality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-292, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015.
"Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings,"
CIRJE-F-955, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," CARF F-Series CARF-F-357, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- repec:eee:indorg:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:165-187 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-03-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2009-03-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:0903. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Diego Dominguez). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ciitamx.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.