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Follow the Leader or Follow Anyone - Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Felix Ebeling

    (University of Cologne)

  • Christoph Feldhaus

    (University of Cologne)

  • Johannes Fendrich

    (University of Cologne)

Abstract

In a fundraising field experiment we show that individuals are not only conditionally cooperative, but that they are also more prone to donate to a homeless individual when the previous donor has a higher social status. We trailed a homeless person asking for donations within Cologne's metro trains for two weeks. Thereby we systematically varied the status of the first giver in the train. In the control treatment we did not intervene. In the low status treatment the first giver was always a (poor looking) low status person from our team and correspondingly in the high status treatment a (rich looking) high status person. In our experiment the probability to receive a donation in a train is 65% higher in the low status treatment than in the control treatment. Additionally, in comparison to the low status treatment, the probability increases by 22% in the high status treatment. To our best knowledge this is the first study providing field evidence for the particular influence of high status individuals on others' economic activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Ebeling & Christoph Feldhaus & Johannes Fendrich, 2012. "Follow the Leader or Follow Anyone - Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-04, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, revised 20 Jan 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgr:cgsser:03-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Conrads, Julian & Ebeling, Felix & Lotz, Sebastian, 2015. "(Dis-)honesty: Measuring overcharging in a real-world market," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 98-102.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    status; fundraising; field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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