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Choosing Club Membership under Tax Competition and Free Riding

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  • Hyun Park
  • Apostolis Philippopoulos

Abstract

We study the choice of club membership, when member-countries’ national governments set their tax policies non-cooperatively. Federal policy (in the form of club membership) has a higher constitutional status than national policies (in the form of income tax rates). This allows federal policy to reduce the inefficiencies arising from uncoordinated national policies. We show that equilibrium membership decreases with any factors that generate Nash-type inefficiencies; growing capital mobility is one such factor. In the particular case in which these inefficiencies take the form of tax competition for mobile tax bases and free riding on other countries’ contribution to international public goods, one can rationalize the formation of very small economic unions only. The normative result is that union enlargement requires a switch from uncoordinated to coordinated national fiscal policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2003. "Choosing Club Membership under Tax Competition and Free Riding," CESifo Working Paper Series 985, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_985
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "The assignment of powers in an open-ended European Union," Post-Print hal-00445601, HAL.
    2. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kornienko, Natalia (Корниенко, Наталья) & Postnikova, N (Постникова, Н.) & Velikova, Elisa (Великова, Елиса) & Gulyaeva, S (Гуляева, С.), 2015. "Tax Competition between Countries and Associations of Countries in the Former Soviet Union [Налоговая Конкуренция Между Странами И Объединениями Стран На Постсоветском Пространстве]," Published Papers mn15, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

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    Keywords

    clubs; capital mobility; federalism;
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