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Gains and losses from tax competition with migration

Author

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  • Honkapohja, Seppo

    (University of Cambridge)

  • Turunen-Red, Arja H.

    (University of New Orleans)

Abstract

We consider international labor (entrepreneur) mobility in a two-country overlapping-generations model. Interactions of decreasing and increasing returns in production yield multiple equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. Governments have an unilateral incentive to reduce income taxes at the joint optimum. We compare the Nash equilibrium in taxes under full labor mobility to the closed economy with no mobility. Despite strategic tax setting, the free mobility outcome is often better in welfare terms. Large, discrete gains in welfare may be attained because of the tax competition. Expectational barriers for discrete welfare improvements can be overcome through tax competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Honkapohja, Seppo & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 2004. "Gains and losses from tax competition with migration," Working Papers 2004-01, University of New Orleans, Department of Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:uno:wpaper:2004-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2002. "EU Enlargement and the Future of the Welfare State," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 49(1), pages 104-115, February.
    3. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467-467.
    4. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701.
    5. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    6. Devereux, Michael P. & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2008. "Do countries compete over corporate tax rates?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1210-1235, June.
    7. David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Factor mobility and fiscal policy in the EU: policy issues and analytical approaches," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 337-378, October.
    8. Baldwin, Richard E. & Krugman, Paul, 2004. "Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-23, February.
    9. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2004. "The New Systems Competition," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(1), pages 23-38, February.
    10. Seppo Honkapohja & Arja Turunen-Red, 2002. "Complementarity, growth, and trade," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 35(3), pages 495-516, August.
    11. Breyer, Friedrich & Kolmar, Martin, 2002. "Are national pension systems efficient if labor is (im)perfectly mobile?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 347-374, March.
    12. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Occhino Filippo, 2008. "Optimal Fiscal Policy When Migration Is Feasible," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax policy; Mobility of labor; Multiple equilibria; Expectation traps;

    JEL classification:

    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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