Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2013. "Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79772, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
References listed on IDEAS
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979.
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
- Haim Levy, 1992. "Stochastic Dominance and Expected Utility: Survey and Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 555-593, April.
- Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002376, David K. Levine.
- Oliver Hart, 2009. "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(1), pages 267-300.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Rajkamal Iyer & Antoinette Schoar, 2015. "Ex Post (In) Efficient Negotiation and Breakdown of Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 291-294, May.
- Oliver Hart, 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, August.
- Francesco Passarelli & Guido Tabellini, 2017.
"Emotions and Political Unrest,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(3), pages 903-946.
- Passarelli, Francesco & Tabellini, Guido, 2013. "Emotions and Political Unrest," CEPR Discussion Papers 9446, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Passarelli & Guido Tabellini, 2013. "Emotions and Political Unrest," CESifo Working Paper Series 4165, CESifo Group Munich.
- Francesco Passarelli & Guido Tabellini, 2013. "Emotions and Political Unrest," Working Papers 474, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Gine,Xavier & Jacoby,Hanan G., 2016. "Markets, contracts, and uncertainty in a groundwater economy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7694, The World Bank.
- Barkaoui, Ahmed & Dragicevic, Arnaud Z., 2016.
"Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market,"
Forest Policy and Economics,
Elsevier, pages 90-100.
- Ahmed Barkaoui & Arnaud Z. Dragicevic, 2016. "Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market," Post-Print hal-01352691, HAL.
- Daido, Kohei & Morita, Kimiyuki & Murooka, Takeshi & Ogawa, Hiromasa, 2013. "Task assignment under agent loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 35-38.
- Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Behavioral Model of Firm Boundaries: Why Does Authority Relation Mitigate Ex Post Adaptation Problems?," ISER Discussion Paper 0863, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Oliver D. Hart, 2013. "More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 19001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
Keywordsrenegotiation; incomplete contracts; reference points; employment contracts; behavioral contract theory;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4031. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.