Firm heterogeneity and the integration trilemma: The utility of Joint ventures in integration versus outsourcing models
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Charlie Joyez, 2018. "Interaction between firm-level and host-country characteristics and multinationals' integration choices," Working Papers DT/2018/03, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
More about this item
KeywordsProperty Right Theory; Asset Ownership; Shared Ownership; International Joint Ventures.;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-11-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2017-11-12 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-INT-2017-11-12 (International Trade)
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