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An Empirical Inquiry Into Cartel Overcharges and Cartel Fines Including an Assessment of the EU’s Guidelines on Cartel Fines and Damages

Author

Listed:
  • Justus Haucap
  • Mehmet Karacuka
  • Hakan Inke

Abstract

Utilizing Connor’s International Cartel Database and employing difference-in-differences methodology, we find that market concentration, the number of buyers and cartel duration have significant impacts on cartel overcharges. We also find that the European Commission's 2006 guidelines on the method of setting fines for cartel infringements seems to have decreased cartel overcharges in the EU. In addition, the EU’s cartel damages directive of 2014 (2014/104/EU) appear to have increased private damage payments. Overall, we find support that these two changes in EU competition policy have a reversing impact on the otherwise increasing trend of cartel overcharges, as making the infringement more costly at least in the EU.

Suggested Citation

  • Justus Haucap & Mehmet Karacuka & Hakan Inke, 2025. "An Empirical Inquiry Into Cartel Overcharges and Cartel Fines Including an Assessment of the EU’s Guidelines on Cartel Fines and Damages," CESifo Working Paper Series 12259, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12259
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June.
    2. Emmanuelle Auriol & Erling Hjelmeng & Tina Søreide, 2023. "Corporate criminals in a market context: enforcement and optimal sanctions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 225-287, October.
    3. Ruben Bento & Pedro Pita Barros, 2025. "The Larger the Tip, the Smaller the Iceberg: Reassessing Anti-cartel Policy Evaluation," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 1-17, December.
    4. Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October.
    5. Justus Haucap & Christina Heldman, 2023. "On the sociology of cartels," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 289-323, October.
    6. Mariuzzo, Franco & Ormosi, Peter L & Majied, Zherou, 2020. "Fines and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    7. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.
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    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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