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Firm Size and Judicial Efficiency in Italy: Evidence from the Neighbour's Tribunal

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  • Silvia Giacomelli
  • Carlo Menon

Abstract

We investigate the causal relationship between judicial efficiency and firm size across Italian municipalities, exploiting spatial discontinuities in tribunals' jurisdiction for identification. Results show that halving the length of civil proceedings, average firm size would increase by around 8-12%, everything else equal. Results are robust to a number of different specifications, based on two different databases.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Giacomelli & Carlo Menon, 2012. "Firm Size and Judicial Efficiency in Italy: Evidence from the Neighbour's Tribunal," SERC Discussion Papers 0108, Spatial Economics Research Centre, LSE.
  • Handle: RePEc:cep:sercdp:0108
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonella Rita Ferrara & Philip McCann & Guido Pellegrini & Dirk Stelder & Flavia Terribile, 2017. "Assessing the impacts of Cohesion Policy on EU regions: A non-parametric analysis on interventions promoting research and innovation and transport accessibility," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 817-841, November.
    2. Sean M. Dougherty, 2014. "Legal Reform, Contract Enforcement and Firm Size in Mexico," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 825-844, September.
    3. Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015. "Does (average) size matter? Court enforcement, business demography and firm growth," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 639-669, March.
    4. Mara Giua, 2014. "Spatial Discontinuity for the Impact Assessment of the EU Regional Policy. The Case of Italian Objective 1 Regions," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0197, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
    5. Riccardo Crescenzi & Mara Giua, 2018. "One or Many Cohesion Policies of the European Union? On the Diverging Impacts of Cohesion Policy across Member States," SERC Discussion Papers 0230, Spatial Economics Research Centre, LSE.
    6. Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2015. "Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: disaggregated evidence for Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 49-74, August.
    7. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Marta Martínez-Matute & Miguel García-Posada, 2017. "Credit, crisis and contract enforcement: evidence from the Spanish loan market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 361-383, October.
    8. Sebastiaan Pompe & Wolfgang Bergthaler, 2015. "Reforming the Legal and Institutional Framework for the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Claims in Portugal," IMF Working Papers 2015/279, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Gianluca Esposito & Sergi Lanau & Sebastiaan Pompe, 2014. "Judicial System Reform in Italy - A Key to Growth," IMF Working Papers 2014/032, International Monetary Fund.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Justice efficiency; Firm size; Spatial discontinuity approach; Italy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

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