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There Will Be Money

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  • Luis Araujo
  • Bernardo Guimaraes

Abstract

A common belief among monetary theorists is that monetary equilibria are tenuous due to the intrinsic uselessness of fiat money (Wallace (1978)). In this article we argue that the tenuousness of monetary equilibria vanishes as soon as one introduces a small perturbation in an otherwise standard random matching model of money. Precisely, we show that the sheer belief that fiat money may become intrinsically useful, even if only in an almost unreachable state, might be enough to rule out nonmonetary equilibria. In a large region of parameters, agents' beliefs and behavior are completely determined by fundamentals.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Araujo & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2010. "There Will Be Money," CEP Discussion Papers dp1004, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  • Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    2. Ritschl, Albrecht & Sarferaz, Samad, 2009. "Crisis? What Crisis? Currency vs. Banking in the Financial Crisis of 1931," CEPR Discussion Papers 7610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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