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BARCOM REPORT 2: Bargaining Systems in the Commerce Sector

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  • Gábor Szüdi
  • Marta Kahancová

    ()

  • Jakub Kostolný

    ()

Abstract

Collective bargaining is an important instrument in wage-setting processes, but lacks underpinning with empirical data. Little is known about what exactly is agreed upon in collective bargaining. Few countries maintain databases with coded collective agreements; and agreements are coded for different topics and levels of detail. Attempts to discuss bargaining results at EU level are hampered by the lack of systematic data-collection of agreements. Social partners perceive an increasing need for cross-country comparisons, i.e., because of growing importance of foreign direct investment in EU member states. Therefore, EU-level social partners in commerce, UNI Europa and EuroCommerce, have expressed their interest in a study of content of collective agreements negotiated by their members at national level. Report 2 studies how particular institutional attributes in sector-specific bargaining systems relate to each other. The findings are quantified in an index of constructive industrial relations (CIR-index). Supported by the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, VS/2016/0106

Suggested Citation

  • Gábor Szüdi & Marta Kahancová & Jakub Kostolný, 2018. "BARCOM REPORT 2: Bargaining Systems in the Commerce Sector," Research Reports 24, Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI).
  • Handle: RePEc:cel:report:24
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    File URL: https://celsi.sk/media/research_reports/RR24.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Driffill, 2006. "The Centralization of Wage Bargaining Revisited: What Have we Learnt?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44, pages 731-756, November.
    2. Streeck, Wolfgang, 1992. "National Diversity, Regime Competition and Institutional Deadlock: Problems in Forming a European Industrial Relations System," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 301-330, October.
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