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Narcissistic CEOs and Executive Compensation

Author

Listed:
  • O'Reilly, Charles A. III
  • Doerr, Bernadette
  • Caldwell, David F.
  • Chatman, Jennifer A.

Abstract

Narcissism is characterized by traits such as dominance, self-confidence, a sense ofentitlement, grandiosity, and low empathy. There is growing evidence that individuals with these characteristics often emerge as leaders, and that narcissistic CEOs may make more impulsive and risky decisions. We suggest that these tendencies may also affect how compensation is allocatedamong top management teams. Using employee ratings of personality for the CEOs of 32 prominent high-technology firms, we investigate whether more narcissistic CEO’s have compensation packages that are systematically different from their less narcissistic peers and specifically whether these differences increase the longer the CEO stays with the firm. As predicted, we find that more narcissistic CEOs who have been with their firm longer receive more total direct compensation (salary, bonus, stock options), have more money in their totalshareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher) compensation and the other members of their team.

Suggested Citation

  • O'Reilly, Charles A. III & Doerr, Bernadette & Caldwell, David F. & Chatman, Jennifer A., 2013. "Narcissistic CEOs and Executive Compensation," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt6dt7p2pm, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt6dt7p2pm
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

    Blog mentions

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    Business; Executive Compensation;

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