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Cycles of Fire? Politics and Forest Burning in Indonesia

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  • Balboni, Clare
  • Burgess, Robin
  • Heil, Anton
  • Old, Jonathan
  • Olken, Benjamin A

Abstract

This paper examines the link between electoral incentives and environmental degradation by exploiting a satellite dataset on 107,000 forest fires and 879 asynchronous district elections in Indonesia. Fires represent a cheap but illegal means of converting forested land to other uses, but they risk burning out of control and creating substantial negative environmental externalities. We find a significant electoral cycle in forest fires. Ignitions and area burned decline during election years but steeply increase in the year after. The results suggest that politicians may suppress this activity at times when it might particularly dent their electoral chances.

Suggested Citation

  • Balboni, Clare & Burgess, Robin & Heil, Anton & Old, Jonathan & Olken, Benjamin A, 2021. "Cycles of Fire? Politics and Forest Burning in Indonesia," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8958q1xb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt8958q1xb
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Monica Martinez-Bravo, 2014. "The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1244-1287, April.
    2. Molly Lipscomb & Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, 2017. "Decentralization and Pollution Spillovers: Evidence from the Re-drawing of County Borders in Brazil," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(1), pages 464-502.
    3. Skoufias, Emmanuel & Narayan, Ambar & Dasgupta, Basab & Kaiser, Kai, 2011. "Electoral accountability, fiscal decentralization and service delivery in Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5614, The World Bank.
    4. Pailler, Sharon, 2018. "Re-election incentives and deforestation cycles in the Brazilian Amazon," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 345-365.
    5. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    6. Seema Jayachandran, 2009. "Air Quality and Early-Life Mortality: Evidence from Indonesia’s Wildfires," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 44(4).
    7. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cisneros, Elías & Kis-Katos, Krisztina, 2024. "Unintended environmental consequences of anti-corruption strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    2. Costa, Francisco & Szerman, Dimitri & Assunção, Juliano, 2025. "The environmental costs of political interference: Evidence from power plants in the Amazon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 242(C).
    3. Du, Rui & Mino, Ajkel & Wang, Jianghao & Zheng, Siqi, 2024. "Transboundary vegetation fire smoke and expressed sentiment: Evidence from Twitter," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    4. Opoku-Mensah, Evans & Ankrah, Martinson Twumasi & Tuffour, Priscilla & Appiah-Otoo, Isaac & Abdallah, Assila, 2025. "Assessing the impact of democratic governance, long and short-term external debt on hydropower generation in BRICS nations using an extended STIRPAT model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 318(C).

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