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Higher Prices from Entry: Pricing of Brand-Name Drugs

Author

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  • Perloff, Jeffrey M.
  • Suslow, Valerie Y.
  • Seguin, Paul J.

Abstract

When a new firm enters a market and starts selling a spatially-differentiated product, the prices of existing products may rise due to a better match between consumers and products. Entry may have three unusual effects. First, the new price is above the monopoly price if the two firms collude and may be above the monopoly price even if the firms play Bertrand. Second, the Bertrand and collusive price may be identical. Third, prices, combined profits, and consumer surplus may all rise with entry. Consistent with our theory, the real prices of some anti-ulcer drugs rose as new products entered the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Perloff, Jeffrey M. & Suslow, Valerie Y. & Seguin, Paul J., 1995. "Higher Prices from Entry: Pricing of Brand-Name Drugs," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt75g4k1nt, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:compol:qt75g4k1nt
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    Cited by:

    1. Alice M. Ellyson & Anirban Basu, 2021. "Do pharmaceutical prices rise anticipating branded competition?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 1070-1081, May.
    2. Helge Sanner, 2005. "Bertrand Wettbewerb im Raum kann zu höheren Preisen führen als ein Monopol," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 75, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    3. Marco Alderighi & Alessandro Cento & Peter Nijkamp & Piet Rietveld, 2011. "Second-degree Price Discrimination and Inter-group Effects in Airline Routes between European Cities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-118/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Kevin Green, 2009. "Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of PAH Drugs," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 55-71.
    5. Chatterjee, Chirantan & Gupta, Samarth, 2024. "Public entry and private prices: New evidence from Indian pharmaceutical markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 473-489.
    6. Yongmin Chen & Michael H. Riordan, 2015. "Prices, Profits, and Preference Dependence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 549-568, December.
    7. Helge Sanner, 2005. "Price Responses to Market Entry With and Without Endogenous Product Choice," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 81, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    8. Michael B. Ward & Jay P. Shimshack & Jeffrey M. Perloff & J. Michael Harris, 2002. "Effects of the Private-Label Invasion in Food Industries," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(4), pages 961-973.
    9. Lindsey, Robin & West, Douglas S., 2003. "Predatory pricing in differentiated products retail markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 551-592, April.
    10. Gil, Ricard & Riera-Crichton, Daniel & Ruzzier, Christian, 2016. "As Seen on TV: Price Discrimination and Competition in Television Advertising," MPRA Paper 75993, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Steven J. Davis & Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, 2004. "Entry, Pricing, and Product Design in an Initially Monopolized Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 188-225, February.
    12. Pazgal, Amit & Soberman, David & Thomadsen, Raphael, 2016. "Profit-increasing asymmetric entry," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-122.
    13. Chi-Cheng Wu & Chih-Jen Wang, 2005. "A Positive Theory of Private Label: A Strategic Role of Private Label in a Duopoly National-Brand Market," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 143-161, April.
    14. Nabin Munirul Haque & Mohan Vijay & Nicholas Aaron & Sgro Pasquale M., 2012. "Therapeutic Equivalence and the Generic Competition Paradox," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, November.
    15. Ferrara, Ida & Missios, Paul, 2012. "Pricing of drugs with heterogeneous health insurance coverage," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 440-456.
    16. Alice M. Ellyson & Anirban Basu, 2018. "The New Prescription Drug Paradox: Pipeline Pressure and Rising Prices," NBER Working Papers 24387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Kokovin Sergey & Zhelobodko Evgeniy, 2009. "Generalized Comparative Statics under Monopolistic Competition:Anti-competitive Paradox, Immiserizing Growth, Catastrophes," EERC Working Paper Series 09/09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    18. Magazzini Laura & Fabio Pammolli & Massimo Riccaboni, 2013. "R&D, Within and Between Patent Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Working Papers 3/2013, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, revised Jul 2013.
    19. Raphael Thomadsen, 2007. "Product Positioning and Competition: The Role of Location in the Fast Food Industry," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(6), pages 792-804, 11-12.
    20. Ernst R. Berndt & Linda T. Bui & David H. Lucking-Reiley & Glen L. Urban, 1996. "The Roles of Marketing, Product Quality, and Price Competition in the Growth and Composition of the U.S. Antiulcer Drug Industry," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of New Goods, pages 277-328, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Brian T. Melzer & Donald P. Morgan, 2009. "Price-increasing competition: the curious case of overdraft versus deferred deposit credit," Staff Reports 391, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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