Tax Compliance and Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
In this paper, we show that considering the classic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) tax compliance problem under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) axiomatics provides a simple explanation for the "excess" level of full compliance observed in empirical studies, and which standard Expected Utility (EU) axiomatics are unable to explain. RDEU axiomatics provide a compelling answer to this puzzle, without the need for the moral sentiments or stigma arguments that have recently been advanced in the literature. Formally, we show that the threshold audit probability at which full compliance becomes optimal for the consumer is significantly lower under RDEU axiomatics than in the EU case. We also show that the comparative statics of tax-evasion with respect to changes in the tax rate or in income are "weaker" than under EU axiomatics. We conclude by presenting numerical simulations using several different parameterizations of the probability weighting function that have been proposed in the literature.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 65 Bd. F. Mitterrand, 63000 Clermont-Ferrand|
Phone: (33-4) 73 17 74 00
Fax: (33-4) 73 17 74 28
Web page: http://cerdi.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Diecidue, Enrico & Wakker, Peter P, 2001.
"On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 281-298, November.
- Diecidue, E. & Wakker, P.P., 2000. "On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility," Discussion Paper 2000-74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Eduardo Engel & James Hines, 2000. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1117, Econometric Society.
- Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & James R. Hines, Jr., 1999. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 6903, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
- Koskela, Erkki, 1983. "A note on progression, penalty schemes and tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 127-133, October.
- Segal, Uzi & Spivak, Avia, 1990. "First order versus second order risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 111-125, June.
- Uzi Segal & Avia Spivak, 1988. "First Order Versus Second Order Risk Aversion," UCLA Economics Working Papers 540, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bernasconi, Michele, 1998. "Tax evasion and orders of risk aversion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 123-134, January.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Drazen Prelec, 1998. "The Probability Weighting Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 497-528, May.
- Ronald G. Cummings & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Michael McKee, 2001. "Cross Cultural Comparisions of Tax Compliance Behavior," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0103, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:460. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vincent Mazenod)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.