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Partial Collusion and Foreign Direct Investment

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We show that the static duopoly model in which firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment is often a prisoners' dilemma game in which a switch from exporting to foreign direct investment reduces profits. By contrast, we show that when the game is repeated there is a range of parameters for which the firms can partially collude by choosing to export rather than invest. In this range, a reduction in export costs may undermine the partial collusion, causing a switch from export to investment.

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File URL: http://patrickminford.net/wp/E2013_9.pdf
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Paper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2013/9.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2013/9
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  1. Brainard, S Lael, 1997. "An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Trade-off between Multinational Sales and Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 520-544, September.
  2. Horstmann, Ignatius J & Markusen, James R, 1987. "Strategic Investments and the Development of Multinationals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 109-121, February.
  3. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
  4. Norman, George & Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Eastern European Economic Integration and Foreign Direct Investment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(4), pages 483-507, Winter.
  5. Smith, Alasdair, 1987. "Strategic investment, multinational corporations and trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 89-96.
  6. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  7. Motta, Massimo & Norman, George, 1996. "Does Economic Integration Cause Foreign Direct Investment?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 757-783, November.
  8. Rowthorn, R E, 1992. "Intra-industry Trade and Investment under Oligopoly: The Role of Market Size," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 402-414, March.
  9. Leahy, Dermot & Pavelin, Stephen, 2003. "Follow-my-leader FDI and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 439-453, March.
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