The Effect of Board Structure on Bidder-Shareholders' Wealth: Further Evidence from the UK Bidding Firms
In this study we provide evidence of cross-sectional dependence of bidder-shareholder wealth and target’s board characteristics. More specifically we provide evidence that the percentage of non-executives, the board size, the stock holdings of executives, and the other directorships held by non-executives serving the target board are important in assessing the announcement of the bid, whereas in the bidder’s board only the percentage of non-executive directors is important for bidder-shareholders. In addition to that we provide evidence that some of these relationships are not monotonic in nature. Finally, in this study it is documented that bidder-shareholder wealth is favoured in acquisitions where bidders have marginally more executive than non-executive directors in their boards and therefore the question arises as to whether “dependent” boards are more efficient than “independent” ones.
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