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Equilibrium Social Distancing

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  • Toxvaerd, F.M.O

Abstract

This paper presents an economic model of an epidemic in which susceptible individuals may engage in costly social distancing in order to avoid becoming infected. Infected individuals eventually recover and acquire immunity, thereby ceasing to be a source of infection to others. Under non-cooperative and forward-looking decision making, equilibrium social distancing arises endogenously around the peak of the epidemic, when disease prevalence reaches a critical threshold determined by preferences. Spontaneous, uncoordinated social distancing thus acts to flatten the curve of the epidemic by reducing peak prevalence. In equilibrium, social distancing stops once herd immunity sets in, but acts to extend the duration of the epidemic beyond the benchmark of a non-behavioral epidemiological model. Comparative statics with respect to the model parameters indicate that the curve becomes flatter (i) the more infectious the disease is and (ii) the more severe the health consequences of the disease are for the individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Toxvaerd, F.M.O, 2020. "Equilibrium Social Distancing," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2021, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2021
    Note: fmot2
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kumar, S. & Quinn, S.C. & Kim, K.H. & Daniel, L.H. & Freimuth, V.S., 2012. "The impact of workplace policies and other social factors on self-reported influenza-like illness incidence during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 102(1), pages 134-140.
    2. Rowthorn, Robert & Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2012. "The Optimal Control of Infectious Diseases via Prevention and Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8925, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Flavio Toxvaerd, 2019. "Rational Disinhibition And Externalities In Prevention," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1737-1755, November.
    4. Toxvaerd, F. & Rowthorn, R., 2020. "On the Management of Population Immunity," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2080, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Timothy C Reluga, 2010. "Game Theory of Social Distancing in Response to an Epidemic," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(5), pages 1-9, May.
    6. Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Philipson, Tomas, 1996. "Rational Epidemics and Their Public Control," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(3), pages 603-624, August.
    7. Fenichel, Eli P., 2013. "Economic considerations for social distancing and behavioral based policies during an epidemic," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 440-451.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic epidemiology; social distancing; non-pharmaceutical interventions; infection control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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