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Strategic investment and international spillovers in natural gas markets

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  • Robert A. Ritz

Abstract

This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of multimarket competition with capacity investments, applied to international gas markets. It identifies a strategic advantage of «focused» pipeline gas producers (e.g., Gazprom) over «diversified» multimarket exporters of liquefied natural gas (e.g., Qatar). Based on this, the paper examines the spillover impacts of the Fukushima nuclear accident onto European gas markets, both in the short- and longer-term. It also discusses Russia’s gas export strategy, especially the 2014 deals with China. More generally, the analysis shows how a less efficient oligopolist can be more profitable, and speaks to policy discussions about «security of supply» in energy markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. Ritz, 2015. "Strategic investment and international spillovers in natural gas markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1510, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1510
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competitive advantage; corporate diversification; liquefied natural gas (LNG); supply security; strategic investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities

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