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‘Regulatory Issues in Merchant Transmission Investment’

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  • Brunekreeft, G.

Abstract

Driven by fear of underinvestment in network assets, merchant investment in electricity transmission networks (MTI) is now legally allowed. Given that MTI is a real possibility, regulators face a new set of questions. After classifying different types of MTI, the paper raises and analyses regulatory questions, concentrating on the effect on competition, ownership questions, third-party-access regimes and must-offer provisions. Basically, the paper concludes that the light-handed approach of unregulated MTI supports a light-handed approach with respect to complementary measures as well. In many cases, it is justified to refrain from sector-specific arrangements because competition law, if necessary at all, will suffice. However, details matter.

Suggested Citation

  • Brunekreeft, G., 2004. "‘Regulatory Issues in Merchant Transmission Investment’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0422, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0422
    Note: CMI38, IO
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep38.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Merchant Transmission Investment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 233-264, June.
    2. Littlechild, S., 2004. "Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0410, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    4. Glachant, Jean-Michel & Pignon, Virginie, 2005. "Nordic congestion's arrangement as a model for Europe? Physical constraints vs. economic incentives," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 153-162, June.
    5. Joshua Gans & Stephen King, 2003. "Access Holidays for Network Infrastructure Investment," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 10(2), pages 163-178.
    6. Gert Brunekreeft & David Newbery, 2006. "Should merchant transmission investment be subject to a must-offer provision?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 233-260, November.
    7. Hogan, William W., 2003. "Transmission Market Design," Working Paper Series rwp03-040, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    8. Rosellón Juan, 2003. "Different Approaches Towards Electricity Transmission Expansion," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-32, September.
    9. Bushnell, James B & Stoft, Steven E, 1996. "Electric Grid Investment under a Contract Network Regime," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 61-79, July.
    10. Brunekreeft, G., 2003. "Market-based Investment in Electricity Transmission Networks: Controllable Flow," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0340, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
    2. Brunekreeft, Gert, 2004. "Market-based investment in electricity transmission networks: controllable flow," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 269-281, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity; Investment; Regulation; Transmission; Merchant;

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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