Issues and Options for Restructuring Electricity Supply Industries
The electricity supply industry is highly capital-intensive, whose success depends critically upon the management of its investment. In most developing countries investment is poorly managed, poorly maintained, and often inadequate. Inadequate regulation or political control lead to low prices that undermine the finance of investment and give poor incentives for management and operation. The paper argues that regulation must be carefully designed to provide efficient incentives and adequate guarantees to sustain investment and operations and only then will privatisation improve performance and benefit consumers. The paper discusses the evidence for these claims, the circumstances required for full unbundling and liberalisation to be successful, and those where the Single Buyer Model or continued, ideally reformed, state ownership, may be preferable, at least until conditions improve.
|Date of creation:||May 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul L. Joskow, 2001.
"California's Electricity Crisis,"
NBER Working Papers
8442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, 2000.
"Regulating the Electricaly Sector in Latin America,"
Documentos de Trabajo
86, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Pablo Serra & Ronald Fischer, 2000. "Regulating the Electricity Sector in Latin America," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Fall 2000), pages 155-218, August.
- David M. Newbery, 2002. "Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262640481, December.
- Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M., 2000. "Benchmarking and regulation: international electricity experience," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 107-130, September.
- Pollitt, M. G., 1997. "The Restructuring and Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in Northern Ireland: Will it be Worth it?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9701, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Preetum Domah & Michael G. Pollitt, 2001. "The restructuring and privatisation of the electricity distribution and supply businesses in England," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 107-146, March.
- Green, Richard & McDaniel, Tanga, 1998.
"Competition in Electricity Supply: Will '1998' be Worth it?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1814, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard Green & Tanga McDaniel, 1998. "Competition in electricity supply: will ‘1998’ Be worth it?," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 273-293, August.
- Newbery, David M., 1997. "Determining the regulatory asset base for utility price regulation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-8, March.
- Newbery, David M., 1997.
"Privatisation and liberalisation of network utilities,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 357-383, April.
- Newbery, D., 1996. "Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Utilities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9620, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Bogorad, Cynthia S. & Penn, David W., 2001. "Cost-of-Service Rates to Market-Based Rates to Price Caps to ?!#?#!?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 61-72, May.
- Watts, Price C., 2001. "Heresy? The Case Against Deregulation of Electricity Generation," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 19-24, May.
- Newbery, D.M. & Pollitt, M.G., 1996. "The Restructuring and Privatisation of the CEGB: Was It Worth It?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9607, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0210. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Dyer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.