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Warum begeben Unternehmen Wandelanleihen?

Author

Listed:
  • Drobetz, Wolfgang
  • Grüninger, Matthias C.
  • Wöhle, Claudia B.

    () (University of Basel)

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt die Ergebnisse einer Fragebogenuntersuchung unter deutschen, schweizerischen und österreichischen börsenkotierten Unternehmen über deren Motive zur Emission von Wandelanleihen vor. Die Antworten der Unternehmen bestätigen die Backdoor-Equity-Hypothese, wonach Unternehmen in der Emission von Wandelanleihen eine Möglichkeit sehen, ihr Eigenkapital mit geringen Informationskosten zu erhöhen. Die zusätzliche Flexibilität bei der Finanzierung zukünftiger Investitionsmöglichkeiten (Realoptionen), die sich bei einer Emission von Wandelanleihen ergibt, besitzt hingegen nur eine geringe Bedeutung. Bei einer detaillierten Auswertung der Antworten nach Unternehmensmerkmalen wie Unternehmensgrösse, Verschuldungsgrad, Dividendenpolitik und Wachstumschancen ergeben sich Inkonsistenzen, die darauf hindeuten, dass in der Finanzierungspraxis nach wie vor die Illusion eines „Free-Lunch“ nicht auszuschliessen ist. Insgesamt zeigen sich Ähnlichkeiten zu bisherigen Untersuchungen, die sich allerdings mehrheitlich auf US-Unternehmen beziehen.

Suggested Citation

  • Drobetz, Wolfgang & Grüninger, Matthias C. & Wöhle, Claudia B., 2005. "Warum begeben Unternehmen Wandelanleihen?," Working papers 2005/02, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  • Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2005/02
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wandelanleihen; Agency-Probleme; Kapitalstrukturpolitik;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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