IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ses/arsjes/2006-iii-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Warum begeben Unternehmen Wandelanleihen?

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfgang Drobetz
  • Matthias C. Grüninger
  • Claudia B. Wöhle

Abstract

Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Ergebnisse einer Fragebogenuntersuchung unter deutschen, schweizerischen und österreichischen Unternehmen über die Motive zur Emission von Wandelanleihen vorgestellt. Die Interpretation der Antworten der befragten Unternehmen bestätigt die Backdoor-Equity-Hypothese, wonach Unternehmen über die Ausgabe von Wandelanleihen eine Möglichkeit sehen, das Eigenkapital zu erhöhen. Damit zeigen sich Ähnlichkeiten zu bisherigen Untersuchungen, die sich mehrheitlich auf US-Unternehmen beziehen. Eine nachrangige Bedeutung hat die Flexibilität der Finanzierung zukünftiger Investitionsmöglichkeiten. Bei der detaillierten Auswertung der Antworten nach Unternehmensmerkmalen wie Unternehmensgröße, Verschuldungsgrad, Dividendenpolitik und Wachstumschancen Inkonsistenzen, die darauf hindeuten, dass in der Finanzierungspraxis nach wie vor die Illusion eines "Free-Lunch" nicht auszuschließen ist.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Drobetz & Matthias C. Grüninger & Claudia B. Wöhle, 2006. "Warum begeben Unternehmen Wandelanleihen?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 142(III), pages 331-365, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2006-iii-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sjes.ch/papers/2006-III-2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mikkelson, Wayne H., 1981. "Convertible calls and security returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 237-264, September.
    2. Harjeet S. Bhabra & Ajay Patel, 1996. "Convertible Bond Financing: Are Some Issuers Mimickers?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 25(4), Winter.
    3. Mayers, David, 1998. "Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real investment options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 83-102, January.
    4. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    5. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
    6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    7. Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March.
    8. Lewis, Craig M. & Rogalski, Richard J. & Seward, James K., 1998. "Agency Problems, Information Asymmetries, and Convertible Debt Security Design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 32-59, January.
    9. David Mayers, 2000. "Convertible Bonds: Matching Financial And Real Options," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 13(1), pages 8-21, March.
    10. Brounen, D. & de Jong, A. & Koedijk, C.G., 2005. "Capital Structure Policies in Europe: Survey Evidence," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-005-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    11. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Brennan, Michael J & Kraus, Alan, 1987. "Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(5), pages 1225-1243, December.
    13. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    14. Stein, Jeremy C., 1992. "Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, August.
    15. Chang, Shao-Chi & Chen, Sheng-Syan & Liu, Yichen, 2004. "Why firms use convertibles: A further test of the sequential-financing hypothesis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 1163-1183, May.
    16. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R., 2001. "The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 187-243, May.
    17. Franck Bancel & Usha R. Mittoo, 2004. "Why Do European Firms Issue Convertible Debt?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(2), pages 339-373, June.
    18. Eugene F. Brigham, 1966. "An Analysis Of Convertible Debentures: Theory And Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 35-54, March.
    19. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1986. "Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 31-60.
    20. Merton, Robert C, 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 449-470, May.
    21. Abhyankar, Abhay & Dunning, Alison, 1999. "Wealth effects of convertible bond and convertible preference share issues: An empirical analysis of the UK market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(7), pages 1043-1065, July.
    22. Ammann, Manuel & Fehr, Martin & Seiz, Ralf, 2006. "New evidence on the announcement effect of convertible and exchangeable bonds," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-63, February.
    23. Asquith, Paul & Mullins, David Jr., 1986. "Equity issues and offering dilution," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 61-89.
    24. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    25. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    26. Frank C. Jen & Dosoung Choi & Seong‐Hyo Lee, 1997. "Some New Evidence On Why Companies Use Convertible Bonds," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 10(1), pages 44-53, March.
    27. Dann, Larry Y. & Mikkelson, Wayne H., 1984. "Convertible debt issuance, capital structure change and financing-related information : Some new evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 157-186, June.
    28. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Drobetz, Wolfgang & Grüninger, Matthias C. & Wöhle, Claudia B., 2005. "Warum begeben Unternehmen Wandelanleihen?," Working papers 2005/02, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    2. Loncarski, I. & Ter Horst, J.R. & Veld, C.H., 2006. "Why do Companies issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market," Discussion Paper 2006-65, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Dutordoir, Marie & Strong, Norman & Ziegan, Marius C., 2014. "Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 80-100.
    4. Dutordoir, Marie & Lewis, Craig & Seward, James & Veld, Chris, 2014. "What we do and do not know about convertible bond financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 3-20.
    5. Roland Gillet & Hubert De La Bruslerie, 2010. "The Consequences of Issuing Convertible Bonds: Dilution and/or Financial Restructuring?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(4), pages 552-584, September.
    6. Chang, Shao-Chi & Chen, Sheng-Syan & Liu, Yichen, 2004. "Why firms use convertibles: A further test of the sequential-financing hypothesis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 1163-1183, May.
    7. Krishnaswami, Sudha & Yaman, Devrim, 2008. "The role of convertible bonds in alleviating contracting costs," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 792-816, November.
    8. Suchard, Jo-Ann, 2007. "The impact of rights issues of convertible debt in Australian markets," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 187-202, July.
    9. Liao, Yulu & Huang, Paoyu & Ni, Yensen, 2022. "Convertible bond issuance volume, capital structure, and firm value," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    10. Mayers, David, 1998. "Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real investment options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 83-102, January.
    11. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Karen Simonyan, 2010. "What Drives the Issuance of Putable Convertibles: Risk‐Shifting, Asymmetric Information, or Taxes?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 1027-1068, September.
    12. Lanfang Wang & Susheng Wang, 2009. "Convertibles and milestones in staged financing," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 33(2), pages 189-221, April.
    13. Li, Hui & Liu, Hong & Siganos, Antonios, 2016. "A comparison of the stock market reactions of convertible bond offerings between financial and non-financial institutions: Do they differ?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 356-366.
    14. Dutordoir, Marie & Pappas, Kostas & Xu, Alice Liang & Zeng, Cheng (Colin), 2023. "Covenants in convertible bonds: Boon or boilerplate?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    15. Florence Andre-Le Pogamp & Khalid El Badraoui, 2013. "Security Design of Callable Convertible Bonds and Issuers' External Financing Costs," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 56(1), pages 61-81.
    16. Mohamed, Hisham Hanifa & Masih, Mansur & Bacha, Obiyathulla I., 2015. "Why do issuers issue Sukuk or conventional bond? Evidence from Malaysian listed firms using partial adjustment models," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 233-252.
    17. Dutordoir, Marie & Li, Hui & Liu, Frank Hong & Verwijmeren, Patrick, 2016. "Convertible bond announcement effects: Why is Japan different?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 76-92.
    18. Marie Dutordoir & Linda Van de Gucht, 2009. "Why Do Western European Firms Issue Convertibles Instead of Straight Debt or Equity?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(3), pages 563-583, June.
    19. Chao, Ching-Hsiang & Huang, Chih-Jen & Ho, Ruey-Jenn & Huang, Hsin-Yi, 2022. "Catering to investors through capital expenditures: Testing assets substitution problem around financing," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    20. Stein, Jeremy C., 1992. "Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wandelanleihen; Agency-Probleme; Kapitalstrukturpolitik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2006-iii-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Steiner (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sgvssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.