IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/boe/boeewp/023318.html

Anchors aweigh? The effect of communicating forecast uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Michael McMahon

    (University of Oxford, CEPR)

  • Matthew Naylor

    (Bank of England, University of Oxford)

  • Ryan Rholes

    (University of Mississippi)

  • Peter Rickards

    (Reserve Bank of Australia, University of Oxford)

Abstract

We examine how central banks can effectively communicate forecast uncertainty in a two-part experimental study. Part I tests how different visual media – fan charts, dot plots, box-and-whisker plots, speedometers, and ranges – communicate uncertainty to both the general public and expert audiences. We find that fan charts are well understood and perform best at jointly conveying both expectations and uncertainty. Part II implements a novel dynamic information experiment with 1,600 UK participants across four stages, examining the effects of uncertainty communication on expectations and uncertainty perceptions over time. We find that while point forecasts anchor expectations marginally more than fan charts initially, forecast errors significantly de-anchor expectations, particularly for ‘unlucky’ errors that move inflation away from target. Critically, fan charts materially mitigate this de-anchoring, acting as an ‘insurance policy’ that helps protect central bank reputation. We also document that the public consistently underestimates the degree of uncertainty, and that communicating uncertainty via fan charts helps the public learn more realistic uncertainty perceptions. Our findings have important implications for central bank communication strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael McMahon & Matthew Naylor & Ryan Rholes & Peter Rickards, 2026. "Anchors aweigh? The effect of communicating forecast uncertainty," Bank of England Staff Working Paper series 1196, Bank of England.
  • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:023318
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2026/anchors-aweigh-the-effect-of-communicating-forecast-uncertainty.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    2. Cieslak, Anna & McMahon, Michael, 2024. "Tough Talk: The Fed and the Risk Premium," CEPR Discussion Papers 19313, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    3. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    4. Andrew Levin & Volker Wieland & John C. Williams, 2003. "The Performance of Forecast-Based Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 622-645, June.
    5. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Rholes, Ryan & Petersen, Luba, 2021. "Should central banks communicate uncertainty in their projections?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 320-341.
    7. Ulf Söderström, 2002. "Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(1), pages 125-145, March.
    8. Mitchell, Olivia S. & Lusardi, Annamaria (ed.), 2011. "Financial Literacy: Implications for Retirement Security and the Financial Marketplace," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199696819.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Donato Masciandaro, 2026. "Monetary Policy and Taylor Reaction Functions: Business Cycles, Central Bank Governance and Central Bankers’ Preferences," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 26270, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Chen, Kairan & Granville, Brigitte & Matousek, Roman, 2026. "Decoding central bank communications with large language models," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    3. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2017. "How multiplicative uncertainty affects the tradeoff between information disclosure and stabilisation policy?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-15, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    4. Dimitris Christelis & Dimitris Georgarakos & Tullio Jappelli & Maarten van Rooij, 2020. "Trust in the Central Bank and Inflation Expectations," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(6), pages 1-37, December.
    5. Fadda, Pietro & Hanifi, Rayane & Istrefi, Klodiana & Penalver, Adrian, 2025. "Central bank communication of uncertainty," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    6. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2014. "The Influence of Central Bank Transparency on Labor Market Regulation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(1), pages 17-32, January.
    7. Isabelle Salle & Marc-Alexandre Sénégas & Murat Yıldızoğlu, 2019. "How transparent about its inflation target should a central bank be?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 391-427, March.
    8. Salle, Isabelle & Yıldızoğlu, Murat & Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre, 2013. "Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 114-128.
    9. Jung, Alexander & Mongelli, Francesco Paolo, 2025. "Central bank communication with non-experts: insights from a randomized field experiment," Working Paper Series 3103, European Central Bank.
    10. Ying, Shan & Sheen, Jeffrey & Gu, Xin & Wang, Ben Zhe, 2025. "Does monetary policy uncertainty moderate the transmission of policy shocks to government bond yields?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    11. Saito, Yuta, 2024. "Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 25-30.
    12. Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2023. "The Stabilizing Effects of Publishing Strategic Central Bank Projections," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 826-868, April.
    13. Tadle, Raul Cruz, 2022. "FOMC minutes sentiments and their impact on financial markets," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    14. Alexandra Piller & Marc Schranz & Larissa Schwaller, 2025. "Using Natural Language Processing to Identify Monetary Policy Shocks," Working Papers 25.05, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    15. Benjamin Born & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "How Should Central Banks Deal with a Financial Stability Objective? The Evolving Role of Communication as a Policy Instrument," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Michael Pedersen, 2020. "Surveying the survey: What can we learn about the effects of monetary policy on inflation expectations?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 889, Central Bank of Chile.
    17. Yoshito Funashima, 2022. "Economic policy uncertainty and unconventional monetary policy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(3), pages 278-292, June.
    18. Jonne Lehtimäki & Marianne Palmu, 2022. "Who Should You Listen to in a Crisis? Differences in Communication of Central Bank Policymakers," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 11(3), pages 33-57.
    19. Marins, Jaqueline Terra Moura & Vicente, José Valentim Machado, 2017. "Do the central bank actions reduce interest rate volatility?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 129-137.
    20. David M. Arseneau & Alejandro Drexler & Mitsuhiro Osada, 2022. "Central Bank Communication about Climate Change," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-031, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:023318. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Research (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/boegvuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.