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Liquidity risk in markets with trading frictions: What can swing pricing achieve?

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  • Ulf Lewrick
  • Jochen Schanz

Abstract

Open-end mutual funds expose themselves to liquidity risk by granting their investors the right to daily redemptions at the fund's net asset value. We assess how swing pricing can dampen such risks by allowing the fund to settle investor orders at a price below the fund's net asset value. This reduces investors' incentive to redeem shares and mitigates the risk of large destabilising outflows.Optimal swing pricing balances this risk with the benefit of providing liquidity to cash-constrained investors. We derive bounds, depending on trading costs and the share of liquidity-constrained investors, within which a fund chooses to swing the settlement price. We also show how the optimal settlement price responds to unanticipated shocks. Finally, we discuss whether swing pricing can help mitigate the risk of self-fulfilling runs on funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulf Lewrick & Jochen Schanz, 2017. "Liquidity risk in markets with trading frictions: What can swing pricing achieve?," BIS Working Papers 663, Bank for International Settlements.
    • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:663
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1998. "Intermediated versus Direct Investment: Optimal Liquidity Provision and Dynamic Incentive Compatibility," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 177-197, April.
    3. Ulf Lewrick & Jochen Schanz, 2017. "Is the price right? Swing pricing and investor redemptions," BIS Working Papers 664, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Madhavan, Ananth, 2000. "Market microstructure: A survey," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 205-258, August.
    5. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1999. "Liquidity creation through banks and markets: Multiple insurance and limited market access," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 991-1006, April.
    6. Sheheryar Malik & Peter Lindner, 2017. "On Swing Pricing and Systemic Risk Mitigation," IMF Working Papers 2017/159, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Roncalli, 2021. "Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management -- Part 3. Managing the Asset-Liability Liquidity Risk," Papers 2110.01302, arXiv.org.
    2. Agostino Capponi & Paul Glasserman & Marko Weber, 2018. "Swing Pricing for Mutual Funds: Breaking the Feedback Loop Between Fire Sales and Fund Runs," Working Papers 18-04, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    3. Ulf Lewrick & Jochen Schanz, 2017. "Is the price right? Swing pricing and investor redemptions," BIS Working Papers 664, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Ulf Lewrick & Jochen Schanz, 2023. "Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Investment Funds: Swing Pricing and Investor Redemptions," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(3), pages 229-267, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial stability; mutual funds; regulation; liquidity insurance; trading frictions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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