Optimal Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts in Labor Markets
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- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro, 2011. "Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 872.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro, 2011. "Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets," Working Papers 11.08, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Etienne Wasmer & Nicolas Lepage-Saucier & Juliette Schleich, 2013.
"Moving towards a single labour contract: pros, cons and mixed feelings,"
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info:hdl:2441/772g8m5php8, Sciences Po.
- Nicolas Lepage-Saucier & Juliette Schleich & Etienne Wasmer, 2013. "Moving Towards a Single Labour Contract: Pros, Cons and Mixed Feelings," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1026, OECD Publishing.
- Pierre Cahuc & Olivier Charlot & Franck Malherbet, 2016.
"Explaining The Spread Of Temporary Jobs And Its Impact On Labor Turnover,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57, pages 533-572, May.
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- Pierre Cahuc & Olivier Charlot & Franck Malherbet, 2014. "Explaining the Spread of Temporary Jobs and its Impact on Labor Turnover," 2014 Meeting Papers 906, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Cahuc, Pierre & Charlot, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2012. "Explaining the Spread of Temporary Jobs and its Impact on Labor Turnover," IZA Discussion Papers 6365, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- repec:eee:labeco:v:46:y:2017:i:c:p:26-46 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsmoral hazard; long-term contracts; equilibrium contracts;
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2012-05-15 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2012-05-15 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2012-05-15 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2012-05-15 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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