On the Joint Production of Research and Training
Universities and research institutions have the responsibility to produce science and to provide training to new generations of researchers. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the determinants of a senior scientist's decisions about allocating time between these tasks. The results of this decision depend upon the characteristics of the research project, the senior scientist's concern for training and the expected innate ability of the junior scientist involved. We analyze the role that a regulator can play in defining both the value of scientific projects and the future population of independent scientists.
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- Alexis Walckiers, 2008. "Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: An application to universities," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/101641, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Alexis Walckiers, 2008. "Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 165-198, April.
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- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Banal-Estanol, A. & Macho-Stadler, I., 2008. "Commercial Incentives in Academia," Working Papers 08/13, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Albert Banal-Estañol & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2010. "Scientific and Commercial Incentives in R&D: Research versus Development?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 185-221, 03.
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