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The Few-Get-Richer: A Surprising Consequence of Popularity-Based Rankings

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Listed:
  • Fabrizio Germano
  • Vicenç Gómez
  • Gaël Le Mens

Abstract

Ranking algorithms play a crucial role in online platforms ranging from search engines to recommender systems. In this paper, we identify a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings: the fewer the items reporting a given signal, the higher the share of the overall traffic they collectively attract. This few-get-richer effect emerges in settings where there are few distinct classes of items (e.g., left-leaning news sources versus right-leaning news sources), and items are ranked based on their popularity. We demonstrate analytically that the few-get-richer effect emerges when people tend to click on top-ranked items and have heterogeneous preferences for the classes of items. Using simulations, we analyze how the strength of the effect changes with assumptions about the setting and human behavior. We also test our predictions experimentally in an online experiment with human participants. Our findings have important implications to understand the spread of misinformation.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Germano & Vicenç Gómez & Gaël Le Mens, 2019. "The Few-Get-Richer: A Surprising Consequence of Popularity-Based Rankings," Working Papers 1073, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1073
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gabrielle Demange, 2012. "Collective attention and ranking methods," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564982, HAL.
    2. Yeon-Koo Che & Johannes Hörner, 2018. "Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 871-925.
    3. Germano, Fabrizio & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2020. "Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    4. Ilan Kremer & Yishay Mansour & Motty Perry, 2014. "Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 988-1012.
    5. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    6. Jerker Denrell & Gaël Le Mens, 2017. "Information Sampling, Belief Synchronization, and Collective Illusions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 528-547, February.
    7. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pantelis P. Analytis & Francesco Cerigioni & Alexandros Gelastopoulos & Hrvoje Stojic, 2022. "Sequential Choice and Self-Reinforcing Rankings," Working Papers 1318, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Germano, Fabrizio & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2020. "Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    3. Saumya Bhadani & Shun Yamaya & Alessandro Flammini & Filippo Menczer & Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia & Brendan Nyhan, 2022. "Political audience diversity and news reliability in algorithmic ranking," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 6(4), pages 495-505, April.
    4. Andrea Polonioli, 2021. "The ethics of scientific recommender systems," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 126(2), pages 1841-1848, February.
    5. Pantelis P. Analytis & Francesco Cerigioni & Alexandros Gelastopoulos & Hrvoje Stojic, 2022. "Sequential choice and selfreinforcing rankings," Economics Working Papers 1819, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    search engine; ranking algorithm; misinformation; Internet; fake news; few-get-richer; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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