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How costly are cartels?

Author

Listed:
  • Flavien Moreau

    (IMF)

  • Ludovic Panon

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

We study the cost of cartels in an oligopoly model with heterogeneous firms, endogenous markups, and collusion. Cartels can amplify or dampen misallocation, by charging supracompetitive markups and reallocating demand towards non-colluding firms. We find that standard competitive oligopoly models understate the cost of markups under reasonable values for the intensity of collusion and cartel composition configurations. Using French micro data, our baseline calibration suggests that breaking down cartels would increase aggregate productivity by 1.1% and welfare by 2%. These numbers shed light on the aggregate importance of collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Flavien Moreau & Ludovic Panon, 2023. "How costly are cartels?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1413, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1413_23
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione/2023/2023-1413/en_tema_1413.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition; cartels; collusion; productivity; welfare; misallocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence

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