IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Risk allocation and incentives for private contractors: an analysis of Italian project financing contracts


  • Rosalba Cori

    () (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri)

  • Cristina Giorgiantonio

    () (Bank of Italy)

  • Ilaria Paradisi

    () (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri)


Based on the economic literature and international comparison, the paper examines the adequacy of the terms of Italian project financing contracts to build and operate public works, and identifies potential areas for improvement. We analyze the main contractual content of the public works construction and management concessions submitted to the Project Financing Technical Unit with a view to monitoring public-private contract partnerships. Overall, the analysis reveals the backwardness of the Italian system and the existence of not insignificant problem areas. The survey supports the need to foster adequate standardization of contracts in Italy aimed, in particular, at ensuring: i) the provision of more appropriate mechanisms for the employment of penalties for breach of contract by the concessionaire, especially in the management phase, and � conversely � of reward mechanisms; ii) the inclusion of clauses relative to the sharing of financing documents by the contracting authorities; iii) appropriate attention to the quantitative elements of the business plan; and iv) the strengthening of supervisory activity of the grantor during the various phases of the contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosalba Cori & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Ilaria Paradisi, 2010. "Risk allocation and incentives for private contractors: an analysis of Italian project financing contracts," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 82, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_82_10

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari, 2011. "Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1173-1211.
    2. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    3. Kappeler, Andreas & Nemoz, Mathieu, 2010. "Public-Private Partnerships in Europe - Before and During the Recent Financial Crisis," Economic and Financial Reports 2010/4, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
    4. Elisabetta Iossa & Federico Antellini Russo, 2008. "Potenzialità e criticità del Partenariato Pubblico Privato in Italia," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 98(3), pages 125-158, May-June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Copiello, Sergio, 2015. "Achieving affordable housing through energy efficiency strategy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 288-298.

    More about this item


    project financing; regulation; risk allocation;

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_82_10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.