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Liquidity Efficiency and Distribution in the LVTS: Non-Neutrality of System Changes under Network Asymmetry

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Listed:
  • Sean O'Connor
  • James Chapman
  • Kirby Millar

Abstract

The authors consider the liquidity efficiency of Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2) by examining, through an empirical analysis, some plausible strategic reactions of individual participants to a systemwide shock to available liquidity in the system. The network structure of the LVTS T2 is found to be asymmetric in terms of the patterns of out-payment flows. It is composed of three subgroups, in which participants within a subgroup are more strongly linked with each other than with participants in other subgroups. Three possible network equilibria are proposed. The equilibria are defined in terms of participant-specific collateral needs and out-payment delays, and result from different relative cost structures involving collateral costs, queuing costs, and payment delay penalties. Each of the conjectural equilibria relate to a dominant strategy for at least those participants most central in the network with respect to liquidity transfer adopted network-wide as a common strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Sean O'Connor & James Chapman & Kirby Millar, 2008. "Liquidity Efficiency and Distribution in the LVTS: Non-Neutrality of System Changes under Network Asymmetry," Discussion Papers 08-11, Bank of Canada.
    • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocadp:08-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin, Antoine & McAndrews, James, 2008. "Liquidity-saving mechanisms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 554-567, April.
    2. Bech, Morten L. & Garratt, Rod, 2003. "The intraday liquidity management game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 198-219, April.
    3. Kim McPhail & Anastasia Vakos, 2003. "Excess Collateral in the LVTS: How Much is Too Much?," Staff Working Papers 03-36, Bank of Canada.
    4. Morten Bech & James Chapman & Rod Garratt, 2008. "Which Bank is the "Central" Bank? An Application of Markov Theory to the Canadian Large Value Transfer System," Staff Working Papers 08-42, Bank of Canada.
    5. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, September.
    6. Elisabeth Ledrut, 2007. "Simulating retaliation in payment systems: Can banks control their exposure to a failing participant?," DNB Working Papers 133, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    7. Darcey McVanel, 2005. "The Impact of Unanticipated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System," Staff Working Papers 05-25, Bank of Canada.
    8. Devin Ball & Walter Engert, 2007. "Unanticipated Defaults and Losses in Canada's Large-Value Payments System, Revisited," Discussion Papers 07-5, Bank of Canada.
    9. Morten L. Bech & James T. E. Chapman & Rod Garratt, 2008. "Which bank is the \\"central\\" bank? an application of Markov theory to the Canadian Large Value Transfer System," Staff Reports 356, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. James Chapman & Yinan Zhang, 2010. "Estimating the Structure of the Payment Network in the LVTS: An Application of Estimating Communities in Network Data," Staff Working Papers 10-13, Bank of Canada.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Payment clearing and settlement systems; Financial services; Financial institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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