The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach
This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), ()-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing ()-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and superadditive games.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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- Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Tadenuma, K, 1992. "Reduced Games, Consistency, and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 325-34.
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