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Collusive networks in market-sharing agreements under the presence of an antitrust authority

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  • Flavia Roldán

    (Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales. Departmento de Economía / University of Navarra. IESE Business School. Public-Private Sector Research Center)

Abstract

This article studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other’s market. The set of these agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This article shows that while in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, when considering the antitrust authority, more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.

Suggested Citation

  • Flavia Roldán, 2012. "Collusive networks in market-sharing agreements under the presence of an antitrust authority," Documentos de Investigación 80, Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales.
    • Handle: RePEc:avs:wpaper:80
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    market-sharing; economic networks; antitrust authority; oligopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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