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Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Group

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Abstract

Ballester, Calvo-Armengol, and Zenou (2006, Econometrica, 74/5, pp. 1403-17) show that in a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with global uniform payoff substitutability and own concavity effects, the intercentrality measure identifies the key player - a player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in overall activity. In this paper we search for the key group in such network games, whose members are, in general, different from the players with the highest individual intercentralities. Thus the quest for a single target is generalized to a group selection problem targeting an arbitrary number of players, where the key group is identified by a group intercentrality measure. We show that the members of a key group are rather nonredundant actors, i.e., they are largely heterogenous in their patterns of ties to the third parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Umed Temurshoev, 2008. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Group," Working Papers 08-08, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0808
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    File URL: http://www.netinst.org/Temurshoev_08-08.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gert Sabidussi, 1966. "The centrality index of a graph," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 31(4), pages 581-603, December.
    2. Temurshoev Umed, 2009. "Hypothetical extraction and fields of influence approaches: integration and policy implications," EERC Working Paper Series 09/06e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, September.
    4. George A. Akerlof, 1997. "Social Distance and Social Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1005-1028, September.
    5. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
    6. Sanjeev Goyal & Marco J. van der Leij & José Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, 2006. "Economics: An Emerging Small World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 403-432, April.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
    8. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2004. "Social Networks And Crime Decisions: The Role Of Social Structure In Facilitating Delinquent Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 939-958, August.
    9. Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2004. "Who's Who in Crime Network. Wanted the Key Player," Working Paper Series 617, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Leo Katz, 1953. "A new status index derived from sociometric analysis," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 18(1), pages 39-43, March.
    11. Dooley, Peter C, 1969. "The Interlocking Directorate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 314-323, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sudipta Sarangi & Emre Unlu, 2011. "Key Players and Key Groups in Teams," Departmental Working Papers 2011-10, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social networks; centrality measures; intercentrality measures; clusters; policies;

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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