Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring
If the owner of a firm cannot commit ex-ante to monitor his workers and the monitoring technology may accuse a diligent worker of shirking (produce a “false positive”), the lack of commitment problem is extremely severe : the worker may shirk even if monitoring is costless. However, the same presence of false positives is necessary for this commitment problem to be fully resolved either through delegation of monitoring or through contracting with a passive third party.
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Watts, Ross L & Zimmerman, Jerold L, 1983. "Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 613-33, October.
- Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987.
"Renegotiation in Repeated Games,"
Economics Working Papers
8759, University of California at Berkeley.
- Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
- Pau Olivella, 1989.
"Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring,"
839, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pau OLIVELLA, 1995. "Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 39, pages 1-32.
- Olivella, P., 1993. "Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 201.93, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
- Sparks, Roger, 1986. "A Model of Involuntary Unemployment and Wage Rigidity: Worker Incentives and the Threat of Dismissal," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(4), pages 560-81, October.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 1985. "Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 599-609, June.
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