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Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets

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  • Aditya Kuvalekar

Abstract

I study a decentralized marriage market with search frictions, costly pre-marital skill investments, and non-transferable utility. Despite a fully symmetric environment, asymmetric equilibria -- in which one gender systematically invests more in skills than the other -- can arise. The match payoffs are microfounded through a non-cooperative household game in which spouses allocate time between labor-market work and domestic production. An asymmetric equilibrium becomes available precisely as the high-skill wage rises. Further, the symmetric equilibria can be fragile while the asymmetric ones are not. Thus, rising skill premia may amplify rather than narrow gender gaps in skill acquisition.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditya Kuvalekar, 2026. "Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets," Papers 2605.10060, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2605.10060
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. V. Bhaskar & Wenchao Li & Junjian Yi, 2023. "Multidimensional Premarital Investments with Imperfect Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(10), pages 2893-2919.
    2. V. Bhaskar & Ed Hopkins, 2016. "Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Premarital Investments with Assortative Matching," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 992-1045.
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