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A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules

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  • Minoru Kitahara
  • Yasunori Okumura

Abstract

We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates existing controlled school choice models, including those utilizing reserve rules, quota rules, and bonus-point rules. Specifically, we introduce an adjusted scoring rule that unifies these rules. By achieving a matching that satisfies the stability defined in this framework, matching authorities can effectively manage the trade-offs inherent in controlled school choice markets. Moreover, the priority order for a school is represented as a weak order with each given assignment, meaning that ties are allowed. Our mechanism ensures a stable matching and satisfies strategy-proofness. In particular, when priority orders are restricted to linear orders with each given assignment, our mechanism guarantees student-optimal stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2025. "A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules," Papers 2503.18220, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2503.18220
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1143-1176, May.
    3. Peter Arcidiacono & Michael Lovenheim, 2016. "Affirmative Action and the Quality-Fit Trade-Off," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 3-51, March.
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