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Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms

Author

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  • Chiaki Moriguchi
  • Yusuke Narita
  • Mari Tanaka

Abstract

What happens if selective colleges change their admission policies? We study this question by analyzing the world's first implementation of nationally centralized meritocratic admissions in the early twentieth century. We find a persistent meritocracy-equity tradeoff. Compared to the decentralized system, the centralized system admitted more high-achievers and produced more occupational elites (such as top income earners) decades later in the labor market. This gain came at a distributional cost, however. Meritocratic centralization also increased the number of urban-born elites relative to rural-born ones, undermining equal access to higher education and career advancement.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiaki Moriguchi & Yusuke Narita & Mari Tanaka, 2024. "Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms," Papers 2402.04429, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.04429
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    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Machado, Cecilia & Szerman, Christiane, 2021. "Centralized college admissions and student composition," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    3. Klein, Thilo & Aue, Robert & Ortega, Josué, 2024. "School choice with independent versus consolidated districts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 170-205.
    4. Kumanomido, Hiroshi & Takayasu, Yutaro, 2024. "Elite Persistence in Family: The Role of Adoption in Prewar Japan," OSF Preprints rmdyp, Center for Open Science.
    5. Hiroshi Kumanomido & Yutaro Takayasu, 2025. "Elite Persistence in Family: The Role of Adoption in Prewar Japan," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 537, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    6. Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021. "Market Design," NBER Working Papers 29367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Hiroshi Kumanomido & Suguru Otani & Yutaro Takayasu, 2025. "Elite Formation and Family Structure in Prewar Japan: Evidence from the Who's Who Records," Papers 2504.18788, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
    8. Gandil, Mikkel Høst, 2021. "Substitution Effects in College Admissions," Memorandum 3/2021, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

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