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Paternalism and Deliberation: An Experiment on Making Formal Rules

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  • Max R. P. Grossmann

Abstract

Mandatory waiting periods have been instituted for medical procedures, gun purchases, and other high-stakes decisions. Are these softly paternalistic policies substitutes for harder restrictions, and are delayed decisions more respected? In a general population survey experiment, Choice Architects make rules for decision-makers facing a high-stakes Bomb Risk Elicitation Task. Treatments vary when the decision is made: on the spot or after one day, and whether the initial decision can be revised. Choice Architects set a cap on the decision-maker's risk taking; in one treatment, they can additionally implement a mandatory waiting period. Exogenous deliberation has no effect on the cap; equivalence testing (TOST) and Bayesian analysis ($\text{BF}_{01} \approx 12$) provide strong positive evidence for the absence of an effect. Endogenously prescribed waiting periods are add-on restrictions that do not substitute for the cap. Choice Architects believe that, with time, the average decision-maker will take less risk and -- because of the distribution of Choice Architects' bliss points -- come closer to Choice Architects' subjective ideal choice; the resulting reduction in forecasted errors is small. Soft and hard paternalistic instruments are not substitutes: waiting periods are deployed as add-on restrictions.

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  • Max R. P. Grossmann, 2025. "Paternalism and Deliberation: An Experiment on Making Formal Rules," Papers 2501.00863, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2501.00863
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