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Strategies in deterministic totally-ordered-time games

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  • Tomohiko Kawamori

Abstract

We consider deterministic totally-ordered-time games. We present three axioms for strategies. We show that for any tuple of strategies that satisfy the axioms, there exists a unique complete history that is consistent with the strategy tuple.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomohiko Kawamori, 2022. "Strategies in deterministic totally-ordered-time games," Papers 2211.03398, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2211.03398
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    1. Bergin, James & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1993. "Continuous Time Repeated Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 21-37, February.
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