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Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules

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  • S. Agarwal
  • D. Ghosh
  • A. S. Chakrabarti

Abstract

In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$ agents play a coordination game repeatedly which has exactly $N$ Nash equilibria and all of the equilibria are equally preferred by the agents. The problem is to select one equilibrium out of $N$ possible equilibria in the least number of attempts. We propose a number of heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning to solve the coordination problem. We see that the agents self-organize into clusters with varying intensities depending on the heuristic rule applied although all clusters but one are transitory in most cases. Finally, we characterize a trade-off in terms of the time requirement to achieve a degree of stability in strategies and the efficiency of such a solution.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Agarwal & D. Ghosh & A. S. Chakrabarti, 2016. "Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules," Papers 1608.00213, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1608.00213
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    1. Anirban Chakraborti & Damien Challet & Arnab Chatterjee & Matteo Marsili & Yi-Cheng Zhang & Bikas K. Chakrabarti, 2013. "Statistical Mechanics of Competitive Resource Allocation using Agent-based Models," Papers 1305.2121, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2014.
    2. Challet, Damien, 2008. "Inter-pattern speculation: Beyond minority, majority and $-games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 85-100, January.
    3. Challet, Damien & Marsili, Matteo & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2013. "Minority Games: Interacting agents in financial markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199686698.
    4. Emanuele Pugliese & Claudio Castellano & Matteo Marsili & Luciano Pietronero, 2009. "Collaborate, compete and share," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 67(3), pages 319-327, February.
    5. Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-411, May.
    6. W. Brian Arthur, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning, Bounded Rationality and the Bar Problem," Working Papers 94-03-014, Santa Fe Institute.
    7. Challet, D. & Zhang, Y.-C., 1997. "Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 246(3), pages 407-418.
    8. Duncan J. Watts & Peter Sheridan Dodds, 2007. "Influentials, Networks, and Public Opinion Formation," Journal of Consumer Research, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 441-458, May.
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