Comunicação Em Política Monetária
Interaction between central banks and private sector occurs through communication between both parts. Accountability and influence on expectations are the two reasons because central banks communicate with markets. In fact, sometimes communicating objectives, targets and perceptions results in ex ante undesired effects. There is reason to suppose that such faillure in the communication between policymakers and markets agents can occur. Policymakers must assess if this faillures are generated by problems that can be resolved by communication itself, and if so, to adopt the correct decision. Thus, to incorporate some elements of the Communication Theory can be helpful for this evaluation, what is done in this article as a contribution to monetary policy literature.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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