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Comunicação Em Política Monetária

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  • Robson Rodrigues Pereira

Abstract

Interaction between central banks and private sector occurs through communication between both parts. Accountability and influence on expectations are the two reasons because central banks communicate with markets. In fact, sometimes communicating objectives, targets and perceptions results in ex ante undesired effects. There is reason to suppose that such faillure in the communication between policymakers and markets agents can occur. Policymakers must assess if this faillures are generated by problems that can be resolved by communication itself, and if so, to adopt the correct decision. Thus, to incorporate some elements of the Communication Theory can be helpful for this evaluation, what is done in this article as a contribution to monetary policy literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Robson Rodrigues Pereira, 2004. "Comunicação Em Política Monetária," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 029, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2004:029
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    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2004/artigos/A04A029.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arminio Fraga & Ilan Goldfajn & André Minella, 2004. "Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 365-416 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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