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Aging at the Very Top

Author

Listed:
  • Valentin Kecht

    (University of Bonn)

  • Alessandro Lizzeri

    (Princeton University, NBER, & CEPR)

  • Farzad Saidi

    (University of Bonn & CEPR)

Abstract

This paper documents that the age at which CEOs are appointed has risen sharply over the past several decades. Using newly assembled data covering a wide set of firms, we show that this increase is concentrated outside the largest listed firms and driven primarily by longer and more diverse external career paths prior to CEO appointment. These patterns are difficult to reconcile with explanations based on demographics, schooling, or tenure, and are instead consistent with a matching framework in which rising demand for generalist human capital leads firms to trade off peak ability for accumulated experience. We investigate the forces behind this shift. Using variation in consulting networks, we establish that firms place greater weight on diversified managerial experience as operating environments have become increasingly uncertain and complex. We also provide evidence for a supply-side response in which prospective CEOs broaden their skill portfolio as demand for generalist skills rises.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentin Kecht & Alessandro Lizzeri & Farzad Saidi, 2026. "Aging at the Very Top," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 404, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:404
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_404_2026.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Babina, Tania & Fedyk, Anastassia & He, Alex & Hodson, James, 2024. "Artificial intelligence, firm growth, and product innovation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
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    4. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2003. "Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1169-1208.
    5. C. Edward Fee & Charles J. Hadlock & Joshua R. Pierce, 2013. "Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 567-601.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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