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Allocating Communication Time in Electoral Competition

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Abstract

Political campaigns influence how voters prioritize issues, which in turn impacts electoral outcomes. In this paper, we study how candidates’ communication shapes which issues prevail during the campaign, through which mechanisms, and to what extent. We develop an electoral competition model with two candidates, each endowed with exogenous platforms and characteristics. Candidates allocate strategically their communication time across two issues to maximize their expected vote shares. We find that when one candidate holds similar comparative advantages on both issues, the disadvantaged candidate communicate on a single issue to saturate the campaign with one topic and then increases the randomness of the election. The advantaged candidate has the opposite incentive and communicate on both issues, creating an asymmetry in the campaign. We show that in some cases, the campaign can become entirely centered on a single issue.

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  • Alexandre Arnout & Gaëtan Fournier, 2025. "Allocating Communication Time in Electoral Competition," AMSE Working Papers 2520, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2520
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Noah Kaplan & David K. Park & Travis N. Ridout, 2006. "Dialogue in American Political Campaigns? An Examination of Issue Convergence in Candidate Television Advertising," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 724-736, July.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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